The term moral hazard generally implies individuals´ tendency to exercise less effort into cost reduction if the negative consequences resulting from their actions are not borne by themselves. This paper analyzes using recent experimental studies under which circumstances moral hazard is likely to occur and how this problem could be mitigated or eliminated. A detailed overview and analysis of field and laboratory experiments from different areas are provided. At first, a description of the experimental process is presented. The paper then concentrates on findings and, additionally, on the discussion of the ethodology. Overall, the results suggest moral hazard to be an important problem in many markets. However, it is found out that experts without personal financial incentives do not respond to customers´ insurance status. Besides, competition mitigates moral hazard on the supply side and evidence shows that moral hazard is less likely to occur in markets for natural disaster insurance where probabilities of damages are low. Additionally, peer pressure and pro-social preferences alleviate the problem of moral hazard in group schemes.

Keywords: First-degree moral hazard; second-degree moral hazard; experiments; analysis.

DOI:  https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v5i4pp410-428